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Introduction
Understanding the character and stringency of immigration policies over time and space is crucial to debates about the causes, effects and governance of international migration. Alas, it is currently impossible to say much that is systematic about national immigration policies, about different regulatory aspects of, or changes in such policies. Despite many important measurement efforts, there are no comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable data on immigration policies and no established method for classifying, measuring, and comparing immigration laws and policies over countries and time.
2 This is a major problem for applied research as it makes it extremely difficult to make precise and meaningful empirical claims about immigration regulations in a comparative or historical perspective.
The "International Migration Law and Policy Analysis" (IMPALA) database project addresses this issue by compiling a new database on immigration regulations with a particular focus on admissions policies. The project involves collaborative, interdisciplinary research to classify and measure the character of the major categories of immigration policy, including economic migration, family reunification, asylum and humanitarian migration, student migration, and acquisition of citizenship. Each country's laws and regulations are coded annually using a common standardized list of questions about the character of such regulations, with coding decisions based on transparently citing written laws and regulations.
The resulting data provide comparable, valid and transparent measures of immigration regulation that captures the nuanced details of immigration law but also provides a basis to estimate the restrictiveness of such regulations at the level of the country, year, and particular aspect of migration and migration law. The present paper provides an overview of the IMPALA database project and gives an empirical overview of immigration policies governing the admission of economic workers based on a snapshot from the first phase of the project. 4 These data involve the coding of six sample countries between the years 1990 and 2008: Australia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United States. This paper thus complements the information provided in Beine et al. (2015) which focuses on two specific years, namely 1999
and 2008.
The discussion below focuses on immigration regulations with respect to economic migration. We document the evolution of entry tracks in policies governing economic migration. We interpret the total number of entry tracks that can be used as a raw indicator of the degree of complexity of that policy and the number of new tracks created each year as reflecting the extent of reforms in that area. We also provide some preliminary data collected in the context of bilateral agreements between countries. This category has been developed quite recently in the IMPALA project and we see it as of primary importance to capture the stringency of policies between pairs of countries, and a natural complement to the coding of unilateral policies. Finally, we discuss some challenges that the project is likely to face in the future, in particular with respect to aggregation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on immigration policy measurement. Section 3 presents the whole IMPALA project and clarifies some key concepts such as the concept of "entry track". Section 4 documents the evolution of entry tracks for economic migration for the six pilot countries. Section 5 discusses the coding of bilateral agreements. Section 6 discusses several aggregation issues and section 7 concludes.
Existing Literature and Contribution of IMPALA
The causes and consequences of admissions policies have given rise to important controversies.. Political economists have formulated competing theoretical approaches to explain actual v. desired immigration policies. Some scholars focus upon real or expected economic impacts of past immigration, such as fears about labor-market competition (Borjas 1999; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006) . Others emphasize ethnic tolerance or cosmopolitanism (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin et al. 1997; McLaren 2001) . Still others focus on cultural and ethnic differences or perceived threats to traditional culture and values, and a decline of "social capital" and trust, that can generate demands for more immigration restrictions (Putnam 2007; Huntington 2004; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000 , Harnoss 2014 or affect redistribution policies (see, e.g., Razin et al. 2011 , Burgoon, 2014 , and Alesina et al., 2014 for recent contributions). And some researchers posit that historical experience with diversity and colonialism foster familiarity with difference and make immigration more acceptable politically (Freeman 1979; Olzak 1992; Cornelius et al. 2004 ).
In line with such reasoning, immigration policy may change with shifts in ideological climate, something that reflects also the domestic-political or organizational strength of extremist groups advocating intolerance (Kitschelt 1995; Joppke 1999; Givens and Luedtke 2004) . Still others focus on immigrants' use of public welfare (e.g. unemployment insurance) and taxation, yielding fears from voters bearing fiscal burdens of immigration (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hanson et al. 2007; Boeri et al. 2002) .
A rapidly growing literature also explores the effects, not just the origins, of .
Given that immigration can affect the attitudes of natives and migrants with respect to economic insecurities and working practices (Burgoon and Raess 2011, Burgoon 2014) , the effects of immigration policies likely extend to welfare states and other public goods. More broadly, immigration policies in general, and admissions policies in particular, may influence cultural and ethnic diversity, social capital, political participation, and partisan alignments (Putnam 2007; Bauer et al. 2000) . Finally, legal researchers have highlighted the impact that immigration policies have on the human rights of migrants and on social cohesion (Bosniak 2006; Crock 2007; Dauvergne 2007; Rubenstein 2002) .
A striking feature of this entire literature on the origins and consequences of immigration policies is that the often-voiced desire to make claims that hold across countries and over time far outstrips the literature's actual ability to do so. Despite some original and pioneering contributions, this emerging area of research is still hampered by the lack of valid, reliable and cross-nationally comparative data on immigration laws and policies.
For the most part, researchers comparing admissions policies have relied most commonly upon qualitative evidence from small N studies that draw on a few countries (Watts 2002; Brochman and Hammar 1999; Hammar 1985; and Meyers 2004) . However, an emerging strand of research has begun to develop quantitative measures of immigration policies in order to address important controversies about their historical development and persisting cross-national differences. Timmer and Williamson (1996; 1998) Mayda (2010) , Ortega and Peri (2009) and the DEMIG database provide good examples of measures of policies based on law changes. While they bring valuable information, this limits the comparability across countries since the levels of immigration restrictions are not known. In contrast, the main purpose of the entry-track approach is to capture these levels, from which reforms can be identified through a year-to-year comparison.
Belot and Ederveen (2012) track cultural barriers to immigration; and Ruhs measures policies regulating the social rights of migrant workers (Ruhs 2011 breakdown migration costs into a policy induced component and an incompressible one using the Galop survey. The policies are therefore estimated rather than directly observed using existing indicators. Other contributions have examined particular features of policy, including asylum and refugee policies, particularly in Europe (Thielemann 2003 (Thielemann , 2004 (Thielemann , 2006 Cerna 2008; Lowell 2005; Hatton 2004; Neumayer 2004; Czaika 2009) , and citizenship policies (EUDO 2011; Howard 2005 Howard , 2006 Howard , 2009 Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005 Koopmans et al. , 2010 Koopmans et al. , 2012 Helbling 2008; Janoski 2010 There are many different dimensions in a basic unit of observations of the IMPALA database: the year under investigation, the recipient country, the category of immigration policy, the specific entry track that is analyzed and the question applied to that entry track.
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Since the entry track concept is obviously a key dimension and characterizes the originality of the IMPALA approach, we explain hereafter the meaning of this concept. A given entry track corresponds to a specific way of entering the country. Such modes of entry are normally distinguished by the purpose of migration and by the characteristics of the participants. For example, one long-established track of entry is the H-1B Visa offered in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 which allows employers to temporarily sponsor and employ foreign workers in specialty occupations.
The concept of entry track is similar to that of a visa but can be more or less inclusive depending on the similarities (or differences) in the ways in which countries treat various types of immigrants. The decision to create a separate entry track for a subset of prospective immigrants is made when a sufficient number of answers to the questions capturing the conditions of entry differ from those for an existing entry track, and that this track concern potentially a significant number of individuals. To illustrate, many countries admit seasonal workers, often through temporary migration programs. Some, such as France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, have lumped all seasonal workers under one category of entry while others, including the United States, have created multiple tracks of entry that distinguish between agricultural and non-agricultural workers. We code these tracks separately when they are treated as such within national legislation.
The dataset focuses on formal and explicit immigration laws and regulations -de jure rules, not de facto implementation and case law. The coded laws and regulations include the most important categories of immigration entry, which we divide into distinct legal tracks clustered in five categories: (1) economic migration; (2) family reunification; (3) asylum and refugee immigration; (4) students; and (5) acquisition (and loss) of citizenship. The IMPALA consortium is also developing data on bilateral agreements between countries with respect to these migration tracks. 10 Within these categories, the number of tracks varies substantially over time and across countries. Table 1 Using all such sources, coders identify the statutes and regulations that affect the number and types of immigrants that can enter a country, the conditions under which immigrants live and work, and their legal rights. In most cases, the questions and associated coding simply indicate the presence or absence of specific characteristics or restrictions (e.g., whether asylum seekers are detained while applications are pending).While the number of entry tracks is endogenous and is determined by the complexity of the law, the final set of questions is selected by coders in the pilot phase through an iterative process.
We first list all the characteristics and conditions addressed in the immigration regulations of the pilot countries (such as education requirements, age, etc.) and choose questions whose answers reflect these conditions. When one particular condition appears idiosyncratic (i.e., is found for only one country), we discard the questions concerning this condition. In other cases, the coding gathers non-binary quantitative data on variables such as number of admissions allowed each year for specific applicants, the duration of stay allowed, waiting periods, fees, and minimum and maximum fines and prison sentences for illegal activities involving undocumented immigrants.
A key feature of the IMPALA coding system is that questions vary by track and type of immigration, allowing later users of the data to construct track-specific measures best suited to their research questions. And fundamental to the IMPALA coding is that every decision about every coded question with respect to any given track, within any given country-year, refers to the original legal sources. The questions gauging distinct features of a given law can number in the hundreds for a given track and year. Table 2 provides a snapshot of the questions pertaining to economic migration for the sake of illustration.
This method is designed to make the database -unlike expert surveys and other attempts to reflect policy trends -completely transparent, replicable, and customizable by future researchers. The resulting data involves systematic cross-nationally and temporally comparable information on hundreds of features of law relevant to any given track within any given category of immigration. These features of the IMPALA methodology should help ensure that the coding of detailed provisions will provide reliable and valid measures of immigration law, policy, and regulation. As an initial offering, we shall provide some illustrative examples of the possible measures of restrictiveness or stringency in admissions policies. One straightforward method involves scaling answers to questions relevant to stringency as taking-on higher values for higher stringency. For instance, the binary yes-no questions are, where relevant to restrictiveness, scaled as 1 for higher stringency and 0 for less. 12 The simplest measure of stringency, to be discussed below, is the sum of the values in a given track-country-yearignoring binary questions whose implications for stringency are less obvious, ignoring also 12 Some questions are coded "required" (1 for higher stringency), "considered" (0.5 for higher stringency), and "no" (0 for less stringency). Finally, some questions involve permits coded on a 4-point scale: permanent permit (-1 least stringent), probationary permanent permit (-0.5 less stringency), temporary permit with the prospect of being eligible to apply for transition to a related permanent permit (0.5 stringency), and temporary permit without being eligible to apply for transition to a related permanent permit (1 stringency). Figure 1 gives the proportion of immigrants in total world immigration in each destination country considered the IMPALA project.
The IMPALA countries represent about half of the total immigration around the world (about 110 million registered migrants in 2000 in the dataset). While this seems rather small, one has to take into account that what matters also is the importance of immigration in the total population of the receiving country. Furthermore, the definition of migrants used here (foreign born residents) leads in some cases to a strong underestimation of the economic importance of immigration. 14 Finally, recall that the figures exclude immigrants who were younger than 25 at the time of the census or survey, as well as illegal immigrants.
Interestingly, our selection of countries captures about 70 percent of the global immigration of skilled workers. This is important because the project aims at capturing not only the restrictiveness (or stringency) of policies in terms of global immigration, but also their selectivity. The shares in Figure 2 illustrate the important role played by the traditional English speaking countries (US, UK, Australia and Canada) in attracting educated workers.
The data also illustrate that continental European countries such as Germany and France tend to attract a higher proportion of unskilled workers compared to English speaking countries.
The project aims at shedding more light on the role that admissions policies play in generating such outcome.
In addition, the IMPALA project will code European Union supranational regulations parallel to the national laws of member states. Such cross-national and EU coverage provides substantial leverage to examine the core theoretical questions discussed above, as the countries exhibit widely varied economic, social, and institutional settings. While the consortium intends to code all years between 1960 and the present, we prioritize coding between 1980 and 2008, since documentation for earlier years tends to be incomplete. Source: Docquier-Marfouk (2006) 
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Source: Docquier-Marfouk (2006) and own calculations. Marfouk (2006) and make available the coding for these pilot countries, years, and tracks, and will continue expanding the database, depending on funding constraints.
Evidence from early estimates

Number of tracks
The number of entry tracks can be used as a raw estimate of the evolution of admission policies in terms of complexity. The multiplicity of these entry tracks show that countries fine tune their policies in order to target some specific categories of migrants. This is obviously the case for economic migration on which we focus in this section. well as a large number of entry tracks. Nevertheless, the very low number of entry tracks for the US (which is by far the most important receiving country with corresponding numbers of more than ten millions and 11.27% respectively) suggests that the correlation is not obvious.
Germany had after 2005 more entry tracks than the US, while it receives ten times less skilled immigrants compared to the US.
A second word of caution concerns entry tracks of secondary importance. Entry-tracks such as religious workers, news correspondents, or airport staff might be important from a societal point of view but concern relatively few workers. In general, the importance of entry 
New tracks
It might be interesting to look at the evolution of entry tracks over time. The net variation in the total number is driven by the creation of new tracks and by the suppression of entry tracks that the authorities consider inefficient or outdated. Therefore, the creation of new tracks might be used as an indicator of immigration reforms in each country. The panels in Figure 4 give the number of new tracks created each year in the six countries under consideration. The height of the bars can be used to visualize the extent of immigration reforms and their timing.
Once again, we focus on the new tracks governing the entry of economic migrants. way policy indices could be constructed. In this latter case, the bilateral information can be used to refine the analysis in two ways. First, bilateral agreements can be used to compute bilateral (not just aggregated) scores of, say, restrictiveness or selectivity of immigration policies and, in turn, this can be used for bilateral analysis (e.g., to assess the role of immigration policies on bilateral migration flows) -see below. Second, even if one uses an "aggregate" rationale, information from bilateral agreements can be used to re-compute aggregate IMPALA scores/indices for each individual country, using for example weighted averages of bilateral scores.
The important reforms to immigration policy in
In the next sub-sections, we show why it is important to account for this bilateral dimension when examining the determinants of migration between two countries, as well as for purposes of aggregation.
Example 1: a bilateral (gravity) setting
Let us assume, for example, that our goal is to understand the determinants of immigration between two countries. Typically, bilateral migration flows (their size, skill or gender composition, etc.) are analyzed in a framework that economists and regional scientists refer to as the gravity framework, that is, a framework where sending and receiving countries are seen as two planets, each with its own characteristics captured by a country fixed effect, while gravity forces (the distance between countries, their wage or educational differential, the fact that they share a common border/language, and their mutual accessibility -which can be the result of bilateral agreements) explain the bidirectional flows of goods (trade), capital and people (migration).
Economists supplement this framework with micro-foundations in the sense that they model the individual decisions of firms to export, or of people to migrate, as resulting from an optimization procedure. In the field of migration, this takes the form of so-called "pseudo gravity models" (see among many others Beine and Parsons, 2012 , Bertoli and FernandezHuertas Moraga, 2013 , or Bertoli and Rapoport, 2015 , for recent applications) of the type:
where the dependent variable is the ratio of m ij,t , the number of migrants from sending country I to receiving country j, to N ii,t , the population of country i at time t. Hence, the dependent variable gives the number of migrants from I to j expressed as a proportion of the sending country population (i.e., this is an emigration rate). The usual explanatory variables are the wage differential between the two countries,
, the distance between them, dist ij (note that distance could be geographic but also cultural, linguistic, etc.), and the immigration (or diaspora) network of immigrants from country i in country j in the previous period, , , which has been shown to significantly affect the size, skill and gender composition of immigration (see McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007 , Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011a and 2011b , Beine and Salomone, 2013 .
Regarding immigration policy, its global (or unilateral) dimension can either be considered as accounted for by the receiving country (or country-year) fixed effect, or singled out through a specific, time-varying indicator, , . Finally, , captures unobserved or omitted factors such as bilateral migration policies; note that networks M i,jt may be strongly correlated with bilateral migration policies while the dependent variable itself, m it,j, will most directly be affected by bilateral agreements; in addition, the existence of bilateral immigration agreements is likely affected by whether the two countries share the same language, have a historical colonial link, etc. Hence, failure to include measures of bilateral immigration policies will lead to biased estimates of virtually all the coefficients in the above equation.
Example 2: aggregate indices of immigration policy stringency
As just explained, the information contained in bilateral agreements allows for computing bilateral measures of admissions policy that can be used for bilateral (gravity) analysis of immigration flows. In addition, the bilateral information that can be matched with the IMPALA categories can further be used to re-compute aggregate IMPALA score/indices of the stringency of immigration policies in each country (using simple or weighted averages of bilateral scores) which can in turn be used for aggregate (cross-country) analysis.
To illustrate this point, let us look at Figure 5 . quantitative (respectively, qualitative) restrictions, and "zero" otherwise.
Assume that country A is both restrictive (R=1) and selective (S=1), that is, has immigration laws imposing quantitative and qualitative restrictions on immigration, while country B is restrictive (R=1) but not selective (S=0). If we compare countries A and B, we will conclude that they are equally restrictive while country A is more selective. If we compare according to an aggregate index, for example an "aggregate IMPALA score" summing the "1s" for the different dimensions of immigration policy (IMPALA score=R+S), then country A has a score of 2 and country B a score of 1. We will therefore conclude that country A has a more stringent immigration policy than country B or, in other words, that it is less open to immigration. R=1xd=0 ; R=1xd=0
S=1xd=0 ; S=0xd=0
R=1xd=0 R=1xd=1
S=1xd=0 S=0xd=1
Note : R=1 stands for restrictive immigration policy. S=1 stands for selective immigration policy.
Let us now capture the bilateral dimension. For all origin countries we draw two arrows from that country to each potential destination, with the direction of the arrow pointing to the direction of the immigration flow: one for whether the immigration flow is subject to a quantitative restriction (the upper arrow), and one for whether it is subject to a qualitative restriction (the lower arrow). Given what we know on general immigration policies in countries A and B, for all arrows toward A we write "1" next to each R-arrow and next to each S-arrow, and for all arrows toward B, we write "1" next to each R-arrow and "0" next to each S-arrow. We then multiply each number by a dummy taking the value 0 or 1 depending on whether there exists a bilateral agreement waiving the restriction (d=0) or the general restriction considered applies (d=1).
Assume that country A signs a bilateral agreement with country D whereby any restriction on immigration from D to A, be it quantitative or qualitative, is waived. The dummy variable capturing the existence of a bilateral agreement therefore takes the value "0" for both arrows from D to A. Given that no such agreement exists between A and C, the Assume also that A and B are members of a multilateral agreement (e.g., the European Union) establishing free mobility of people between its members. That is, any restriction to mobility between them, be it quantitative or qualitative, is cancelled by virtue of the joint membership in the multilateral organization. Multilateral agreements can be treated as a series of reciprocal bilateral agreements. To capture this, we multiply all R and S scores by "0", as shown for the bidirectional arrows between A and B. Finally, we assume that country B has no bilateral agreement with the other, third countries. The dummy variable capturing the (non)existence of a bilateral agreement between B and, respectively, C and D, takes the value "1" for all four remaining arrows.
We are now able to compare immigration policies across countries in a more meaningful way. To illustrate this, let us have a look at Table 3. Table 3 shows that while country A is both restrictive and selective, its restrictions apply only in the case of country D.
If we give equal weight to all origin countries (of course, different weighting procedures can be applied depending on the choices that will be made to compute IMPALA indices), 22 then country A has a restrictiveness score of 1/3 and a selectivity score of 1/3, which aggregate to an overall average score of 2/3. Country B, on the other hand, is restrictive but not selective.
However, quantitative restrictions apply to two countries out of three. Using the same weighting procedure as above, country B therefore has a restrictiveness score of 2/3 and a selectivity score of 0, which aggregate to an overall score of 2/3. Comparing A and B, we will now conclude that A is less restrictive (and still more selective, although by a lower margin) than B, while the two countries have the same level of openness in their overall immigration policy. This is a very different -and much more accurate -conclusion from the one we reached when looking at "unilateral" immigration laws only. As is clear from the above, our treatment of bilateral agreements within the IMPALA framework is essentially to see them as a discrimination (or privilege) favoring some particular countries for which an existing restriction that applies unilaterally to other countries is waived. Formally, we code bilateral agreements as a dummy variable taking the value "0" when a particular restriction is waived for a particular country and "1" otherwise. Following the general principles of the broader project, this will be very transparent in our coding of the data, allowing users to make their own aggregation choices. The same logic applies to multilateral agreements, such as those among EU countries, as they can be seen as a series of bilateral agreements.
As a "real-world" illustration of such a mechanism, we can use the case of bilateral agreements concluded by Germany with a set of extra-European countries. We focus here on the regulations governing the movement of one particular type of workers, namely intracorporate transfers (ICTs). This is therefore specific to a particular entry track. With the prevailing global trend towards a higher degree of internationalization of economic activities, this particular entry track has become more important over time. Actually, the EU promoted The general immigration law in Germany stipulates that the maximum stay of ICTs without being subject to a labor market test is 3 years. ICTs coming to Germany under the specific BAs are subject to a different regulation. They can stay up to 4 years without any labor market test. 27 Therefore, this provision might be seen as relaxing the restriction associated to the general immigration regulation. This is nevertheless subject to the fact that the employee has been employed for at least one year before the transfer to the German branch. Furthermore, if the maximum period of stay of 4 years is reached, the ICT is allowed to reapply for a maximum of 2 years. This illustrates that BAs can introduce variations in the degree of stringency for specific entry tracks in both directions, i.e. may release some of the restrictions but at the same time impose other ones than those prevailing in the general immigration law.
26 http://www1.bgbl.de/ 27 See http://www1.bgbl.de/ and in particular ASAV, Art.3 para 3 juncto Beschv, 28 para.2
Aggregation issues
The most disaggregated unit of observation in the IMPALA database takes the form of the answer to a specific question applying to a particular entry track in a specific migration One of the ultimate objectives of the IMPALA database is to create indexes capturing the characteristics of immigration policy. These might be restrictiveness indexes for instance, capturing the extent to which a given country sets tough conditions to allow prospective migrants to enter the country. In turn, this raises the question about how to aggregate the basic information collected in the IMPALA database. We disregard here the issue of aggregation across categories (economic, family, students) and focus only on aggregation within a single country. We address here two types of aggregation: (1) aggregation of the questions within a given track, and (2) aggregation of entry tracks within a given category.
Aggregation of questions
Several important issues emerge regarding the aggregation of questions within a single entry track. A first issue relates to the combination of quantitative and qualitative information. For instance, the requirement of a minimum wage to qualify as a highly skilled worker relates not only to whether this requirement exists but also to the amount that is mentioned in the law. A second issue is the weights that are assigned to each question. These weights are supposed to reflect the importance of each question. We think that these weights should be chosen by the users of the database depending on their use. Nevertheless, given the high number of questions (more than 130 questions for economic migration), this might be a difficult task.
Finally, a tricky problem relates to the treatment of the missing information and of the zeroes. To illustrate this point, suppose that we have a set of three questions applicable to a set of three entry tracks, each of which captures conditions of entry for high skilled workers in a given country. The three questions relate to whether education is taken into account, whether professional experience is taken into account, and whether language skills of prospective migrants are evaluated. Suppose that for Country A, the law is very clear and explicit, that for country B, it is unclear with respect to the last two questions, and that for country C it is unclear regarding linguistic skills only. For each question, 1 indicates a positive answer, 0 a negative answer. This situation is summarized in Table 4 . The last two rows of Table 4 capture the final outcome of the aggregate index under two different aggregation schemes. In the last row but one, we assume that if nothing is mentioned in the law, this is equivalent to an explicit statement that the law does not impose this requirement. In the last row, we assume in contrast that the condition is ambiguous and the computation of the aggregate index does not include this question. A comparison of the two cases suggests that the treatment of ambiguity is of primary importance: in the first case, the most ambiguous country is considered the least selective while in the other case, it appears as the most selective. This illustrates the importance of the choice of treatment of ambiguous information in the law.
The implication of this is that we need to make an explicit distinction between cases in which the immigration law implies a clear negative answer and cases in which there is no explicit answer. Therefore, the raw data will include some qualitative information associated to negative answers, with detailed information about the sources in the law and/or the origin of the coding. It is then up to the final user to make the final coding of ambiguous answers and to decide whether he/she will include those specific questions. Furthermore, the pilot phase should identify the set of particular questions that are associated with ambiguous answers for a majority of countries. This could suggest a change in the exact wording of these questions, or even that these questions should be deleted.
Aggregation of tracks
We now turn to the aggregation of entry tracks. All entry tracks are of course not of similar importance. This creates two separate issues. First, several countries have 'exotic' entry tracks that concern very few people. Furthermore, there are idiosyncratic entry tracks in that they are found only in a single country. A striking example of such an entry track is the visa for crews on super-yachts in Australia that was introduced in 2008. This limits the comparability across countries. In turn this raises the issue of whether these 'exotic' tracks should be kept in the aggregation process.
The second issue concerns the importance of the entry tracks and the weighting scheme that we want to use. Suppose that we want to build an index concerning the selectivity of immigration policy on education requirements and that we select one question related to the education level needed to be admitted. One possible way of weighting entry tracks would be to use the proportion of migrants entering the country in each of our track the year before.
This might be problematic, however, for two reasons. First, this type of data might be unavailable in a lot of cases. Annual flows of migrants are difficult to find even at the aggregate level. The availability of annual flows of immigrants broken down by entry track might be more the exception than the rule. 28 Second, the proportion of immigrants in each entry track is obviously endogenous. In particular, they will depend on the requirements and the restrictions that the immigration authorities impose on prospective migrants. This will in turn lead to biases in the aggregated indexes. Professional experience 1 n/a 0 Language skills 0 n/a n/a Index (n/a treated as 0) 2/3 1/3 1/3
Index (forget n/a) 2/3 1 1/2
Conclusion
The IMPALA project aims at building a new database capturing immigration policies applied to various types of prospective migrants in some of the major immigration countries. The project emphasizes the need to yield comparable data across countries and over time, recognizing and trying to address the difficulties inherent to defining a methodology applicable to all countries while at the same time able to capture the differences in the policies conducted. After careful work on the methodological aspects, the research consortium of the IMPALA project has started to apply these methodologies to a set of pilot countries for the most recent period.
This paper provides an overview of the IMPALA project and illustrates the progress that has been made with some data pertaining mostly to policies governing economic migration. The key idea of the IMPALA project is to code policies from the immigration laws prevailing in each country. The most important concept underlying the IMPALA approach is the concept of entry track which defines one particular way for a migrant to be admitted in the country. The paper gives early estimates of the number of entry tracks for economic migrants in six pilot countries over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The data illustrate the significant degree of heterogeneity in the number of entry tracks across countries.
Each identified entry track in each category of migration is subject to a set of questions that allows for capturing the conditions of admission for that particular entry track. This means that the basic unit of observation in the IMPALA database integrates several dimensions: country, year, category, entry track, and question. In turn, this raises a number of issues as to how these observations can be aggregated to yield meaningful indices of stringency in immigration policies. The paper discusses several of these issues. One issue relates to how we might code when there is an uncertainty in the law concerning some particular aspects of the policy.
In addition to the coding of immigration policies in the different categories, the IMPALA project has also developed a methodology to capture bilateral migration policies.
These bilateral policies are variations of the policies specific to a particular migration corridor. Their coding is important for several reasons. One is that it is a natural complement to the immigration policies captured in the various categories. Another reason is that it allows for measuring whether and to what extent some immigration countries discriminate across migrants of different origins.
